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MUTUAL FUNDS, PENSION FUNDS, HEDGE FUNDS
AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY-WHAT
REGULATION BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION IS APPROPRIATE?
Roberta S. Karmel*
INTRODUCTION
Seventy years ago the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was created to serve investors. At that time investors in the pub-
lic securities markets were primarily individuals investing their own
savings. Today, investors in the public securities markets are primarily
institutions investing the savings of their beneficiaries. These institu-
tions determine how capital is allocated in the national economy, and
they are responsible for managing the private retirement savings of
millions of Americans. Under the federal securities laws, they are a
privileged and protected class. Yet, their behavior in the stock market
bubble of the late 1990s was problematic and contributed to serious
losses of retirement savings by many of their beneficiaries. Although
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) I imposed many new
regulatory responsibilities on public companies, the problem of im-
proving the responsibility of institutional investors to their benefi-
ciaries was not addressed.
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 2 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),3 which created the SEC, were
New Deal statutes passed in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the
Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a
former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The author
thanks Dean Joan Wexler for a summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law School
for the preparation of this Article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the
helpful and perceptive research of Brooklyn Law School student Anna Tydniouk.
1 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
3 Id. §§ 78a-78mm.
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and the Great Depression. The investigation of stock exchange, bank-
ing and securities markets practices by the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency which preceded the enactment of the first fed-
eral securities laws exposed stock market manipulation, insider trad-
ing and breaches of fiduciary duty by those who controlled public
corporations and their intermediaries. These laws were based on
some fundamental premises which have withstood the test of time.
First, when a corporation seeks funds from the public it becomes a
public body and its managers and bankers become public functiona-
ries. Therefore, such a body must make full disclosure about its busi-
ness and financial affairs when it makes a public offering of its
securities and subsequently. Although the basic purpose of the securi-
ties laws is investor protection, a secondary purpose implicates the na-
tional welfare. Because the stock market is efficient in disseminating
information, full disclosure by public companies should facilitate the
efficient allocation of capital in the national economy.
4
The second fundamental premise of the federal securities laws,
dating back to 1934 and endorsed and amplified by amendments to
the Exchange Act in 19645 and 19756 was that transactions in the pub-
4 There has been much debate about how efficient the stock market may be and
whether the efficient market hypothesis is an adequate explanation for stock market
behavior in view of psychological factors affecting the market. See Stephen J. Choi &
A.C. Prichard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2003) (remarking
on the reality of non-rational investor bias); Ronald Gilson & Reineer Kraackman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984) (attributing market efficiency
to a variety of factors, but also noting the absence of any unified explanation of mar-
ket efficiency); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 140-48 (2002) (re-
garding "efficiency-defying" market behaviors of investors not related to rational, in-
formation-based decisions); Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some
Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DuKE L.J. 1397, 1409-12
(2002) (attributing market inefficency to investor actions that do not fit the "rational-
man model"); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 619-40 (1988)
(questioning the influence of informational efficiency objectives on the regulation of
the securities market). The SEC continuous disclosure system is based on the effi-
cient market hypothesis to some extent and it has been accepted by the courts. See
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,380, 11,382 & n.9 (Mar. 16, 1982); Amendments to Annual Report Form,
Related Forms, Regulations, and Guides, Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Sys-
tems, Securities Act Release No. 6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630, 63,630-731 (Sept. 25,
1980); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988) (acknowledging
that Congress has relied on the "premise that securities markets are affected by infor-
mation, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor's reliance on the integrity of
those markets").
5 Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88467, 78 Stat. 565.
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lic securities markets are affected with a national public interest, and
therefore the stock market and securities industry intermediaries
need to be regulated to protect the national banking system and the
Federal Reserve System and to insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets in securities transactions. 7 Among other things, the
Congress which passed the Exchange Act was concerned about mar-
ket manipulation and stock market speculation caused by undue se-
curities credit.8 The tools which Congress gave the SEC to deal with
these evils have become obsolete to a great extent, 9 but the danger to
the capital markets resulting from speculation and leverage was inade-
quately guarded against during the bubble years of the late 1990s.
In the finger pointing following the collapse of the 1990s stock
market bubble, there was a reexamination of the public disclosure sys-
tem which led to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, giving the SEC
much more regulatory power over the accounting profession and pub-
lic company corporate governance. 10 Underwriting practices in con-
nection with initial public offerings (IPOs) have also come under
scrutiny resulting in civil and criminal prosecutions and changes in
the regulation of research analysts and underwriting allocations."
The SEC also has more recently focused on trading irregularities by
mutual funds and has embarked upon mutual fund corporate govern-
6 Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
7 See Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
8 See H.R. REP. No. 97-626, pt. 1, at 3 (1982) (asserting that uncontrolled trading
of securities on credit had been a major cause of the Stock Market Crash of 1929); see
also Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DuKE L.J. 701, 728-33 (1999) (detailing the legislative
history of the Securities Exchange Act).
9 For example, the short selling prohibitions make little sense after decimaliza-
tion, see Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50,103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6,
2004), and the margin regulations have barely been enforced by either the Federal
Reserve Board or the SEC for several decades, see Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic:
Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REv. 777, 797-99 (2000). In any
event, the development and growth of the derivatives market has undermined the
margin regulations. See infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
10 This topic was previously explored by the author in Roberta S. Karmel, Realiz-
ing the Dream of William 0. Douglas- The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge
of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005).
11 See Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet Bust, 7 FORD-
H-AMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 21 (2001) (exploring the legal aspects of the IPO process and
explaining how its mechanics played a significant role in priming the Internet boom
and its eventual implosion); Jaimee L. Campbell, Comment, Analyst Liability and the
Internet Bubble: The Morgan Stanley/Mary Meeker Cases, 7 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 235
(2001) (commenting on possible liability where analysts engaged in collusive market
strategy rather than objective analysis of stock potential).
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ance reform.12 Nevertheless the role of institutional investors in fo-
menting the stock market bubble of the 1990s has not been
scrutinized by the SEC. In part, this is because the SEC is stuck in the
paradigm of investor protection rather than institutional investor reg-
ulation, and institutions are the biggest and noisiest of the SEC's in-
vestor constituents. 13
Further, the SEC regulates mutual funds, but it does not regulate
pension funds, hedge funds or other collective investment pools. Pen-
sion funds are regulated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), the Department of Labor and the states; 14 bank collective
trust funds are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency;1 5 com-
modity pools are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC);16 and hedge funds are not regulated. The purpose
of much of the existing regulation of institutional investors is to safe-
guard the savings of the beneficiaries of institutional investors
through safety and soundness and fiduciary principles, but since this
regulation is conducted by so many different regulators for different
purposes and constituencies, the regulation is neither consistent nor
coherent. Further, little of this regulation takes into account the
SEC's essential goals of fostering capital formation or efficiently allo-
cating capital in the national economy.
This Article will question whether institutional investors should
continue to be regulated by such different and inconsistent regulators
12 See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004); Sara Hansard, New Fund Legislation Unlikely
this Year; Congress Leaves Regs in the SEC's Hands, INVESTMENT NEWS, May 17, 2004, at
12, 12 ("Congress is unlikely to enact a law this year that would impose more regula-
tions on the mutual fund industry. Instead, it is leaving that up to the [SEC].").
13 The author explored this topic in Roberta S. Karmel, Should A Duty to the Corpo-
ration Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 Bus. LAW. 1 (2004).
14 See Donna Litman Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code
Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can be Used to
Pay Claims?, 61 Am. BANiKo. L.J. 219 (1987) (questioning the applicability of bank-
ruptcy law to pension funds, regulated by applicable nonbankruptcy laws); Bradley P.
Rothman, Note, 401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Debacle, 54 FLA. L. REV. 921,
925-41 (2002) (outlining the evolution of retirement and private pension plans and
the role of ERISA).
15 The Comptroller's regulation is similar to the SEC's regulation of mutual
funds, but bank collective trust funds do not have independent corporate boards. See
Deborah S. Prutzman & Edwin C. Laurenson, Impact of ERISA on Choice of Mutual or
Collective Investment Funds as Funding Vehicles, 651 PLI/CoMas. 789, 807 (1993); see also
Marvin A. Freedland, National Banks as Service Providers to Employee Benefit Plans, 113
BANKING L.J. 994 (1996) (exploring the matrix of laws and regulations governing col-
lective trust funds).
16 7 U.S.C. §§ 6m, 6o (2000).
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and whether securities regulation should refocus on the control of
speculation and excessive securities credit. It is useful to contrast the
SEC's regulation of investment companies to the regulation of pen-
sion funds because these are the vehicles for the retirement savings of
most individuals. Investors in bank collective trust funds and hedge
funds tend to be wealthier and more sophisticated. All of these insti-
tutional investors are capable of generating the kind of speculative
stock market behavior the federal securities laws were designed to
control. Hedge funds in particular are one of the significant forces in
speculative markets. Since bank collective trust funds and commodity
pools are regulated by other federal agencies and any attempt by the
SEC to regulate these entities would involve serious turf warfare, the
regulation of these entities will not be discussed in this Article. 17 The
SEC has begun to stake a claim for the registration of hedge funds,
but remains focused on investor protection rather than institutional
investor regulation.
This Article will proceed by summarizing the regulation of the
investment practices of investment companies and pension funds and
then suggesting that institutional investors were too heavily invested in
speculative equities at the top of the technology bubble. Mutual fund
and hedge fund reform proposals will be analyzed for the purpose of
inquiring whether they would prevent similar unwise investment prac-
tices in the future. The relaxation of curbs on speculative trading and
securities credit will then be discussed, with some attention to the ac-
tivities of hedge funds.
Part I of this Article will compare the regulation of mutual fund
and pension fund investment practices and discuss institutional inves-
tor behavior at the top of the 1990s stock market. In Part II, this Arti-
cle will then discuss the SEC's ongoing reform of mutual fund
regulation and its proposed reform of hedge fund regulation and in-
quire whether any of these reforms would act as a curb on excessive
speculation by these funds. Part III will turn to a discussion of the
provisions of the federal securities laws designed to protect against
speculation and manipulation and raise questions about why these
17 Regulatory turf battles between the SEC and CFTC are described in Jerry W.
Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 356-66
(2003). Both the SEC and CFTC are independent federal agencies. Regulatory bat-
tes between the SEC and the Department of Treasury involve competition between
an independent agency and an executive branch agency. See DanJamieson & Michael
Hayes, SEC Beat Up in Glass-Steagall Repeal, REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE, Jan. 2000, at
40; David Wighton, SEC and Fed Clash Over Broker-Dealers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at
17.
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provisions were inadequate to prevent the 1990s bubble and its inevi-
table collapse. The author will argue that although there has been
considerable regulatory reform since the technology bubble burst, lit-
tle attention has been paid to whether a contributing cause of the
bubble was excessively cheap capital and easy securities credit which
encouraged stock market speculation. Perhaps this is because the cul-
prits in this story include the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board,
agencies which probably are institutionally incapable of bursting a
stock market bubble, as well as very powerful institutional investors.
I. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION OF THE
INVESTMENT PRACTICES OF MUTUAL FUNDS, PENSION
FUNDS AND HEDGE FUNDS
A. Investment Company Act Regulation
Investment companies are financial intermediaries in that they
transform the savings of individuals into capital in the form of buying
corporate debt or equity. The main reason for the rise of investment
companies, however, was not intermediation, but their offer of afford-
able, expert and trustworthy management and the opportunity for di-
versification by small savers. 18 The most common type of investment
company is a mutual fund. Functionally, the investment company is
"a shell, a pool of assets consisting of securities, belonging to the
shareholders of the fund."1 9 Such companies may be closed-end or
open-end companies (which issue redeemable shares). Investment
companies in the United States generally are organized as corpora-
tions and they have separate advisers and underwriters. The invest-
ment company generally has no employees and its investments are
managed by an affiliated organization. These relationships give rise to
a variety of conflicts of interest which are regulated under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act).20
Mutual funds are required to register with the SEC pursuant to
the Investment Company Act2' in addition to having to register a pub-
18 See TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULA-
TION 16-17 (1998).
19 Zell v. Intercapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1982).
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000).
21 Id. § 80a-8(a) (requiring investment companies to register by filing a notifica-
tion of registration with the Commission). However, there are exemptions from re-
gistration allowing private investment companies (which includes most hedge funds)
not to register under the Investment Company Act, e.g., companies with less than one
hundred shareholders are exempted from the registration requirement. Id. § 80a-
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lic offering of their shares pursuant to the Securities Act.22 Once reg-
istered, the Investment Company Act requires that forty percent of
the board be "independent" or "disinterested." 23 Interested directors
are defined to include a long list of persons who have some business
or professional relationship with the investment company or are affili-
ated with the adviser, underwriter or broker for the investment com-
pany.24 The investment company's independent directors are given
special statutory responsibilities with regard to the supervision of man-
agement and financial auditing. In particular, they have the duty of
reviewing and approving the contracts of the investment company
with its investment adviser and principal underwriter.
25
Congress's purpose in structuring the Investment Company Act
in this way was to place the disinterested directors in the role of watch-
dogs to act as an independent check on the management of the in-
vestment company. Therefore, even where state rather than federal
law determines a conflict of interest issue such as the dismissal of a
derivative suit, the policies of the Investment Company Act must be
taken into consideration. 26 Yet, because an investment company is
the creature of its sponsor/adviser, there have been persistent ques-
tions as to whether independent directors can provide effective over-
sight of the contractual relationship between the fund and the
adviser.27 Although the fund's directors can and do perform a watch-
dog function, they do not function like directors of an industrial or
financial services company, participating in decisions about the fund's
strategy or investment activities. Fund boards do not and cannot su-
pervise the business and management of the firms that manage fund
assets or distribute and market fund shares.
3(c) (1). Investment companies selling their shares to unrestricted numbers of quali-
fied purchasers are also exempted from registration. Id. § 80a-3(c) (7).
22 Id. § 77e.
23 Section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act requires that a registered invest-
ment company's board of directors may not consist of more than sixty percent "inter-
ested" persons. Id. § 80a-10(a). In 2001, the SEC mandated that more than fifty
percent of an investment company board be composed of independent directors.
Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No.
7932, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001). Currently, the SEC requires that boards have
a supermajority of seventy-five percent independent directors. See infra notes 125-29
and accompanying text.
24 Investment Company Act § 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19).
25 Id. § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).
26 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1979).
27 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXGH. COMM'N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF
CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 264-66 (1992) (discussing advisor fee
arrangements designed to protect investors).
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Over the years, the SEC has conditioned a number of exemptive
rules under the Investment Company Act upon review and approval
by independent investment company directors. Because the Invest-
ment Company Act contains numerous sweeping prohibitions against
transactions with affiliated entities which are, in fact, commonplace,
reliance on these exemptive rules are necessary to permit investment
companies to conduct business in many situations. The most impor-
tant of these exemptions permit funds to purchase securities in a pri-
mary offering where an affiliated broker-dealer is a member of the
underwriting syndicate, 28 permit the use of fund assets to pay distribu-
tion expenses, 29 permit securities transactions between a fund and an-
other client of the fund investment adviser,30 and specify conditions
under which funds may pay commissions to affiliated brokers in con-
nection with the sale of securities on an exchange. 31
Investment companies are organized under state law and there-
fore can structure their capitalization like other corporations3 2 except
for certain restrictions set forth in the Investment Company Act. Al-
though the federal statute does not require investment companies to
have redeemable securities, if they do, purchases and redemptions
must be effected at the current net asset value per share computed
after the receipt of the purchase or redemption order.33 Investment
companies are severely limited in their ability to borrow. The undue
use of leverage was one of the evils the Investment Company Act was
28 Exemption for the Acquisition of Securities During the Existence of an Under-
writing or Selling Syndicate, 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (2004).
29 Distribution of Shares by Registered Open-End Management Investment Com-
pany, id. § 270.12b-1.
30 Id.
31 Brokerage Transactions on a Securities Exchange, id. § 270.17e-1. The other
exemptive rules are 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-8 (permitting mergers between certain affili-
ated funds), 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4(b)(2) (permitting boards to approve interim advi-
sory contracts without shareholder approval), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l (d) (7)
(permitting funds and their affiliates to purchase joint liability insurance policies), 17
C.F.R. § 270.17e-1 (specifying conditions under which funds may pay commissions to
affiliated brokers in connection with the sale of securities on an exchange), 17 C.F.R.
§ 27 0.1 7 g-l (j) (permitting funds to maintain joint insured bonds), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.18f-3 (permitting funds to issue multiple classes of voting stock) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.23c-3 (permitting the operation of interval funds by enabling closed-end funds
to repurchase their shares).
32 Maryland is the state incorporation jurisdiction of choice because of some stat-
utory provisions targeted at investment companies. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar,
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 721-22 (2002).
33 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(c) (2000); Pricing of Redeemable Securities for Distribu-
tion, Redemption and Repurchase, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1.
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designed to prevent.34 Open-end companies may issue only one class
of stock and may not issue senior securities.35 Closed-end companies
may borrow from a bank, or issue bonds, debentures or preferred
stock but such senior capital is limited in that the company must have
a ratio of assets to debt of at least three to one, and, if preferred stock
is issued, the ratio must be at least two to one.36 Other restrictions
involving the prevention of undue leverage are that mutual funds may
not make margin purchases, sell securities short or invest more than a
small percentage of assets in other investment companies.37 Although
trading in derivatives by funds is not clearly contrary to the Investment
Company Act, it raises questions about whether some derivatives trad-
ing strategies involve the kind of undue leverage the statute was de-
signed to prevent.38
The Investment Company Act does not restrict or control what
securities are proper investments for an investment company, but in
keeping with the general full-disclosure philosophy of the federal se-
curities laws, it requires a mutual fund to notify shareholders of its
fundamental investment policies.3 9 There are some exceptions. The
statute prohibits investment companies from purchasing or acquiring
securities of any broker, dealer, underwriter or investment adviser.40
The purpose of this prohibition was to protect investment companies
against risky investments and to restrict reciprocal practices between
investment companies and securities industry members.41
If an investment company advertises itself as a "diversified" mu-
tual fund, it must invest its assets in a specified manner. Seventy-five
percent of its assets must consist of cash and cash items, government
securities, securities of other investment companies, and other securi-
ties. 42 But a fund may not include in this seventy-five percent asset
class securities of a single issuer accounting for more than five percent
of the fund's assets or consisting of more than ten percent of the is-
34 See Investment Company Act § 1 (b) (3)-(8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b) (3)-(8).
35 Id. § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f). Such a company may borrow from a bank
provided that immediately after such borrowing there is an asset coverage of 300%.
Id.
36 Id. § 18(a)-(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)-(e).
37 Id. § 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d).
38 See Memorandum Regarding Mutual Funds and Derivative Instruments from
Division of Investment Management to Chairman Levitt (Sept. 26, 1994), in THE SEC
SPEAKS IN 1995, at 520, 542-44 (I PLI Course Handbook B-880, 1995).
39 FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 18, at 291.
40 Investment Company Act § 12(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (3).
41 FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 18, at 292.
42 Investment Company Act § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1).
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suer's voting securities. 43 In order to register with the SEC, an invest-
ment company must disclose, among other things, whether it will be
open- or closed-ended, whether it will be diversified or nondiversified,
whether the company will concentrate its investments in a particular
industry or group of industries, whether it plans to purchase and/or
sell real estate or commodities, whether it will make loans to other
persons, and it must describe the company's portfolio turnover for the
preceding three years.44 Further, the fund must describe all of its in-
vestment policies which may change only if authorized by a share-
holder vote, and those policies which are fundamental to the
company.45
As the foregoing reflects, investment companies are free to fash-
ion whatever investment strategies they wish, with some limited restric-
tions, provided that any significant changes in that strategy are ratified
by shareholders. While this regime separates government from pri-
vate sector decisionmaking as to which companies merit capital invest-
ment, as is fitting in a capitalistic economy, it is premised on the
notion that investment companies will employ investment strategies
that are competent and trustworthy, keeping in mind the interests of
their shareholders. Unfortunately, this ideal has not always been
followed.
B. Pension Fund Regulation
1. Federal Law
To the extent pension funds are regulated by federal law, they are
subject to supervision by the Internal Revenue Service, 46 the Depart-
ment of Labor and the PBGC. Most of this oversight and regulation is
conducted pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). 47 Pension funds fall into two basic types-defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans.48 If a pension plan is
terminated (due to a corporation's insolvency, for example) the
43 Id.
44 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1).
45 Id. §80a-8(b)(2)-(4).
46 In order for payments into pension funds by corporations to be tax deductible,
the funds must comply with certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Act. I.R.C.
§§ 401, 404, 501 (Lexis 2005).
47 Pub. L. No. 93-405, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000)).
48 Defined benefit plans collect individual assets into an aggregated plan account
and guarantee a particular amount upon retirement. By contrast, defined contribu-
tion plans give employees an individual account which an employee will receive upon
retirement. Defined contribution plans allow an employee to control the investment
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PBGC guarantees basic, vested benefits, up to a monthly dollar limit
for defined benefit plans.49 However, the PBGC does not insure de-
fined contribution plans.
ERISA establishes some rudimentary guidelines for the funding
of defined benefit plans. Pre-1974 plan obligations must be funded
with contributions to amortize them over a forty-year period; post-
1974 obligations must be funded with contributions to amortize them
over a thirty-year period. Reasonable actuarial procedures and esti-
mates must be used for these amortization programs, taking into ac-
count asset values and portfolio earnings.50 There are no such
funding requirements for defined contribution plans.
ERISA mandates fiduciary responsibilities for investment manag-
ers, trustees or any other person with control over the pension plan or
its assets. The applicable legal standard is the same standard long ap-
plied under trust law-the skill and diligence of a "prudent man" loyal
to the plan and without conflicting interests. 51 This requirement ap-
plies to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Defined
benefit plans must be reasonably diversified. This diversification re-
quirement prohibits a fiduciary from investing the whole or an unrea-
sonably large proportion of the trust assets in either one type of
security or a group of securities that are all dependent on the welfare
of one industry or the conditions in one geographical area.52 The
decisions made by the account and are therefore more risky. See Rothman, supra note
14, at 929.
49 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1322a, 1322b (2000).
50 Id. § 1082. The negative impact on corporate financial statements of these re-
quirements because of stock market declines after 2000 led to congressional relief for
public companies. Pension Funding Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 596
(2004); see Pension Park, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004, at 73; see also Editorial, Pension
Bailout Forgets Little Guy, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Apr. 12, 2004, at Al0 (calling for a "more
comprehensive and thoughtful solution"); Editorial, Pensions Still in Crisis, DENVER
POST, Apr. 18, 2004, at E6 (criticizing pension relief bill as a short-term solution to a
long-term crisis), available at 2004 WL 59323416.
51 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1); see Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Plan Funding:
How Much Is Too Much?, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1993); Roger C. Siske et al., What's
New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case and Other Developments, in A.L.I.-
A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSA-
TION PLANS 81-82 (2004); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (re-
ferring to the prudent person standard). One court described ERISA's fiduciary
duties as having three components: a duty of loyalty pursuant to which all investment
decisions must be made with an eye to the interests of the participants and benefi-
ciaries, a prudent man obligation, and an obligation to act for the exclusive purpose
of providing benefits to the beneficiaries. Gregg v. Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343
F.3d 833, 840-41 (6th Cir. 2003).
52 See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996).
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degree of investment concentration is not stated as any fixed percent-
age, although no more than ten percent of a plan's assets are sup-
posed to be invested in securities of the employer. 53 After ten years of
an all-equities investment strategy, the PBGC decided it had taken on
too much risk and is reducing stocks to as little as fifteen percent of its
total investments, but this change in investment policy does not apply
to regulated pension funds.5 4 Many defined contribution pension
plan funds are invested in mutual funds or are in self-directed ac-
counts at securities firms. These pension plans are not subject to any
investment guidelines. 55
Unfortunately, the enforcement powers of the PBGC are meager.
Responsibility for monitoring the financial soundness of pensions is
split with the Internal Revenue Service and the PBGC does not have
strong corrective authority. Since the PBGC is basically an insurer of
certain pension plans, it does not have specific authority to intervene
in corporate transactions, but it does have de facto power to intervene
to protect its own interests. The PBGC can seek court approval for
plan termination when the employer fails to satisfy funding standards
or when the potential long-term loss for the PBGC can be expected to
increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated.56 Suits to enforce
fiduciary duties of pension plan trustees are brought by the Depart-
53 See PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BARBARA W. FREEDMAN, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE § 6.06 (2d ed. 2003). ERISA bans a defined benefit plan from acquiring em-
ployer securities if after the acquisition the aggregate fair market value of employer
securities and employer property is over ten percent of the fair market value of the
assets of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2). However, ERISA does not significantly
limit the ability of 401 (k) participants to invest in employer securities. After the En-
ron debacle, the problem of employee investment in employer securities was given
attention, but the only provision included in Sarbanes-Oxley banned corporate insid-
ers from selling company stock during periods when plan participants cannot sell
their employer's stock. 15 U.S.C.S. § 7244 (Lexis Supp. 2004). There was an attempt
in recent pension reform legislation to limit investments in an employer's securities in
a 401 (k) plan to twenty percent, but this legislation was eventually abandoned. See
Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and Other Imperfect Ac-
tors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 505 n.135 (2004).
54 See Mary William Walsh, Pension Agency to Cut Its Stock Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2004, at C3.
55 A large number of pension plans are managed by insurance companies and
therefore are regulated by state insurance laws. Banks also manage a large number of
other private pension funds and the investment of such funds is regulated by the
banking laws. A discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of this Article. The
Department of Labor can enforce ERISA provisions governing 401 (k)s that invest in
mutual funds. See, e.g., Kathy Chu, Fund Track: U.S. Investigated Funds Over 401(k)s,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2004, at D9 (reporting on Labor Department probes into invest-
ment companies).
56 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1), (a)(4), (c).
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ment of Labor.57 Such suits may also be brought by plan participants
or beneficiaries, or other fiduciaries.
58
Many 401 (k) plans, regulated under ERISA, are heavily invested
in company stock of an employer. After the bursting of the stock mar-
ket bubble in 2000, employees in such plans saw the value of their
account balances decline drastically. In some situations involving par-
ticularly high flying corporations which had financial restatement or
even insolvency problems, lawsuits were brought under ERISA charg-
ing breach of fiduciary duty or violations of the federal securities laws
in class actions or actions by the Department of Labor.59 Union pen-
sion funds as well as corporate and individually directed pension
funds are covered by ERISA. As the result of the insolvency of Capital
Consultants, an investment management company, the Department of
Labor filed five consent orders against more than forty trustees of
union pension and benefit funds for, among other things, ignoring
their funds' guidelines on the amount of their funds that should be
invested in risky private investments, such as collateralized notes.60
2. State Law
ERISA broadly preempts state law breach of fiduciary duty ac-
tions.61 Therefore state law does not regulate the investment or capi-
tal funding policies of ERISA-regulated pension plans.62 State law
does regulate the investment policies of state pension funds. Such
regulation is a curious, and probably obsolete, m61ange of ideas de-
signed on the one hand to prevent pension funds from unduly risky
investments and on the other hand to promote local industry.
New York retirement law, for example, requires that not more
than 2.5% of pension fund assets shall be invested in a railroad, tele-
57 See id. §§ 1134-1135. Enforcement of the diversification requirements is not
always rigorous. See, e.g., Metzler v. Graham, 112 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
that the plan administrator did not violate his duties under ERISA even though he
invested sixty-five percent of the plan assets in one area of undeveloped land).
58 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3).
59 See Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn't Sell My Company Stock: Is
There an ERISA (or '34 Act) Remedy for Me, 36 CONN. L. REV. 385, 385-89 (2004).
60 See Nat'l Legal & Policy Ctr., DOL Settles Five Portland Pension Fund Suits, UNION
CORRUPTION UPDATE, Apr. 15, 2002, at http://www.nlpc.org/olap/UCU3/05_08-17.
htm.
61 29 U.S.C. § 1144; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 44, 52 (1987)
(stating that the "section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language").
62 See NICHOLAS KASTER ET AL., 2000 U.S. MASTER PENSION GUIDE 2726, 2728;
see also Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1992)
("ERISA pre-empts any state law that refers to or has a connection with covered bene-
fit plans.").
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phone, gas or electrical corporation. 63 Massachusetts prohibits more
than twenty percent of any assets of a state retirement pension fund of
any county, city or town to be invested in railroad obligations, more
than thirty-five percent of such assets to be invested in telephone com-
panies' bonds and more than fifty percent of such assets in the bonds
of public service companies. 64 Codes attempt to guarantee some di-
versification by requiring that only a limited percentage of assets shall
be invested in a specific company.65 States may encourage invest-
ments in local businesses66 or place limitations on investments in par-
ticular geographical areas outside the state or the United States. 67
Some state codes place limitations on the debt to equity alloca-
tions of the pension funds. New York dictates that not more than sev-
enty percent of a public retirement system pension fund shall be
invested in equity.68 Florida requires that no more than eighty per-
cent of a fund's assets shall be invested in equity and no more than
eighty percent of the assets shall be invested in interest-bearing obliga-
tions with a fixed maturity of any corporation. 69 Notwithstanding
such provisions, the state codes leave the pension fund boards consid-
erable freedom in deciding not to follow these guidelines in their bus-
iness judgment.70
63 N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAw § 177 (McKinney 2001).
64 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 23(2) (b) (i) (A), (B), (C) (Lexis 2001).
65 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.47 (West 1999) (not more than three percent in
the stock of one issuing corporation); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 23(2) (b) (i) (not
more than two percent in one railroad company, not more than four percent in the
bonds of one public service company).
66 California dictates that a teachers' pension fund board
shall give first priority to investing not less than 25% of all funds of the plan
that become available in a fiscal year for new investments, in ... [slecurities
representing a beneficial interest in a pool of obligations secured by a lien or
charge solely on residential realty located in the state.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22362 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
67 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 121.153 (regulating investments in institutions doing
business in Northern Ireland); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 32, § 23 (limiting investments in
Northern Ireland and South Africa); N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAw § 177 ("[T]he
aggregate unpaid principal amount of all obligations of the Dominion of Canada...
shall not exceed five percentum . . ").
68 N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAw § 177.
69 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.47.
70 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22362 (a), (d) (board may substitute higher-yielding in-
vestments if it determines during any fiscal year that compliance with the code will
result in overall lower earnings); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.47 (five percent can be in-
vested as deemed appropriate notwithstanding limitations); N.Y. RETIRE & Soc. SEC.
LAW § 177 (twenty percent may be invested within board's discretion notwithstanding
limitations).
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C. Hedge Funds
Hedge funds are investment vehicles that hold a pool of securi-
ties, and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not sold in a regis-
tered public offering and which are not registered as investment
companies under the Investment Company Act.7 1 The classic hedge
funds were formed for the purpose of hedging highly leveraged long
positions by utilizing short sales and put and call options. 72 Today's
hedge funds engage in a wider variety of investment strategies.
Ever since hedge funds became participants in the securities mar-
kets in the 1950s, they have endeavored to operate as unregulated
entities and the SEC has been uncertain about how, if at all, to regu-
late them. Most hedge funds in the United States are formed as lim-
ited partnerships in order to obtain flow-through tax treatment.
73
The general partner of the partnership falls within the definition of
an "investment adviser" under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(Advisers Act) ,v but if the hedge fund is counted as only one client,
the entity is exempt from registration because it has fewer than fifteen
clients and it does not hold itself out to the public as an adviser.
75
Many hedge funds nevertheless have registered as investment advisers,
but the majority are not so registered. 76 One of the reasons the classic
hedge funds were reluctant to register with the SEC was that they tra-
ditionally charged performance fees. SEC regulation has dealt with
this problem, however, so that a registered adviser can charge a per-
formance fee to qualified clients.
77
If investment partnerships or hedge funds have fewer than one
hundred beneficial owners, they ordinarily are exempt from registra-
71 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N STAFF, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS:
STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 3 (2003)
[hereinafter GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/stud-
ies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
72 Ralph S. Janvey, Hedge Funds, 21 REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 91, 91
(1998).
73 Id. Some overseas hedge funds are differently organized. lain Cullen, Hedge
Funds: Structure and Documentation, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION 1, 1-4 (lain
Cullen & Helen Parry eds., 2001).
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -13 (2000). Section 202(a) (11) defines an "investment
adviser" to include "any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities, or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities." Id.
§ 80b-2(a) (11).
75 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3); see Investment Ad-
visers Act Release No. 983, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,206 (1985).
76 GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 71, at 22.
77 Id. at 61-62.
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tion under the Investment Company Act.78 Hedge funds also raise
issues as to whether registration as broker-dealers under the Exchange
Act might be required. 79 The SEC has distinguished between "deal-
ers" and "traders," however, and has not insisted that hedge funds reg-
ister as dealers.8 0 Unless a hedge fund is managing plan assets it
would not be regulated as a fiduciary under ERISA.81
Since hedge funds generally operate as exempt entities under the
federal securities laws and ERISA, they are not subject to any funding
or diversification requirements with regard to their trading activities
except to the extent that the partnership agreements pursuant to
which they operate contain such restrictions. The general partner
could be subject to general fiduciary obligations under state law or the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, but it is unlikely that
such obligations would inhibit their investment practices.
D. Investment Practices by Institutions
In 1948, one-third of pension fund assets were invested in insur-
ance company annuity products backed up by long-term bonds, pri-
marily government bonds. More than eighty percent of the
remainder was also invested in bonds. Only five percent or less was
invested in corporate equities.8 2 But economic events and economic
theory changed this conservative investment strategy. Modem portfo-
lio theory (MPT) argued that it was essential to diversify investment
portfolios,83 the mantra that over time equities were a better invest-
78 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1).
79 Section 3(a) (5) defines a dealer as a person engaged in the buying and selling
of securities for his own account. Id. § 78c(a) (5).
80 See GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 71, at 18. Hedge funds may also be
required to register as commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisors with
the CFTC. See id. at 23.
81 Id. at 28.
82 See MICHAELJ. CLOWES, THE MONEY FLOOD: HOW PENSION FUNDS REVOLUTION-
IZED INVESTING 5-6 (2000).
83 MPT is an investment strategy aimed at achieving a specified level of return at
the minimum investment risk. Portfolio managers utilizing MPT diversify their port-
folios according to the MPT risk/return model. The investment portfolio is evaluated
on the basis of its overall performance instead of performance of particular stocks.
Two main factors in MPT are expected return and standard deviation return. Assets
with various rates of return and standard deviations are selected by a fiduciary to
achieve an expected return and reduce standard deviations. MPT is a basis for the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See Frederic J. Bendremer, Modern Portfolio Theory and
International Investments Under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR.J. 791, 792, 798-801 (2001); see also RobertJ. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, The New
Prudent Investor Rule and the Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34
Am. Bus. L.J. 39 (1996) (discussing the evolution of the prudent investor rule and
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ment than bonds84 persuaded many investors to heavily weight their
portfolios in equities, and inflation and rising salaries made pension
plans which relied upon low fixed-income returns very expensive for
corporations and others with defined contribution plans.85 There-
fore, pension funds turned increasingly to equity investments and
other more speculative ventures.
For example, the ownership of common stocks in public em-
ployee pension funds increased from twenty-six percent of their assets
in 1980 to sixty percent in 1999.86 By the end of 2003, state pension
portfolios had a sixty-five percent average allocation to equities (in-
cluding real estate and private equity) and a thirty-five percent alloca-
tion to fixed income. 87 However, asset allocation varies widely from
state to state. Six of the 123 retirement systems had allocations to eq-
uity that equaled or exceeded seventy-five percent and nine systems
had equity allocations below fifty percent.88 The median equity allo-
cation for corporate pension funds was sixty-five percent and ranged
from a low of fifteen percent to a high of ninety-six percent in 2003.89
State defined benefit retirement systems have become seriously
underfunded. In 2000, at the top of the bull market, state pension
assets exceeded liabilities by $245 billion and the ratio of assets to lia-
bilities was 115%. At the end of 2003, assets had fallen to $1.7 trillion,
while liabilities had increased six percent and the ratio of assets to
liabilities was only eighty-two percent.90 During that same year, pen-
developments in light of the MPT); John Lintner, Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal
Gains from Diversification, 20 J. FIN. 587 (1965) (discussing risk and portfolio strate-
gies); James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REv. ECON. STUD. 65
(1958) (attributing the relationship between cash demand and interest rates to as-
sumptions regarding liquidity preference in the market).
84 See Hu, supra note 9, at 802-07. This is true only over the long run, and pen-
sion fund obligations may have a shorter time span.
85 Fin. Pipeline, Pension Fund Investments, at http://www.finpipe.com/peninvest.
htn (last visited Nov. 29, 2004); see also Mark McSherry, Reuters, Pensions Take More
Risks as Shortfalls Grow--Survey, Mar. 22, 2004, available at http://www.globalaging.
org/pension/us/private/2004/shortfall.htm.
86 CLOWES, supra note 82.
87 WILLSHIRE RESEARCH, 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS:
FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION, available at http://www.wilshire.com/Com-
pany/2004_StateRetirementFundingReport.pdf. Both U.S. equity (42.71%) and
non-U.S. equity (13.31%) were included in these figures. Id. app. G.
88 Id. at 2.
89 John Ehrhardt, Milliman Pension Fund Survey, at http://www.milliman.com/eb/
pension-fund-survey (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
90 WILLSHIRE RESEARCH, supra note 87, at 3-4.
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sion funds began to move money into hedge funds. 91 Corporate pen-
sion funds also have become seriously underfunded. According to the
Wilshire Survey of 2004, eighty-one percent of corporate pension
plans are now underfunded, down from eighty-nine percent in 2003.
The median corporate funded ratio is eighty-two percent, up from sev-
enty-eight percent a year ago.9 2 Indeed, because of the adverse im-
pact of such underfunding on public companies, Congress recently
passed legislation to ameliorate the charges against earnings that such
underfunding would reflect by changing the interest rate used for cal-
culating a number of defined pension plan funding parameters. 93
Institutions were big investors in the now grounded high flyers of
the bull market of the 1990s. Sometimes this occurred because of
trading strategies based on indexation and sometimes because of poor
analysis of an issuer's business prospects and financial statements. Al-
though a number of these companies were required to restate their
financial statements, issuer fraud is not an adequate explanation for
such large investments at the top of the bull market by supposedly
sophisticated investors. 94
Let us take Enron as an example. The ten largest shareholders in
Enron in December 2000 were Alliance Premier Growth Fund (4.1%),
Fidelity Magellan (0.2%), AIM Value (1%), Putnam Investors (1.7%),
Morgan Stanley Dividend Growth Fund (0.9%), Janus Fund (2.9%),
Janus Twenty (2.8%), Janus Mercury (3.6%) and Janus Growth and
Income (2.7%). 95 Numerous public retirement accounts also lost
enormous amounts of money; for example, the New York City pension
fund lost $110 million, the Ohio state pension fund lost $114 million,
the New York State Pension Fund lost fifty-eight million dollars and
the total aggregate loss across all University of California portfolios
91 See Chris Clair, Seeking Diversification: Institutions Pump Billions into Hedge Funds;
Industry on Target for up to $4 Billion in Allocations by Year's End, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENTS, July 21, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 9143177.
92 WILSHIRE RESEARCH, 2004 CORPORATE FUNDING SURVEY ON PENSIONS, at http://
www.wilshire.com/Company/2004 CorporateFundingSurvey.pdf. However, these
aggregate figures hide considerable differences between individual plans. Only
nineteen percent of the plans have pension assets that equal or exceed liabilities.
This is down from 2000 when seventy-one percent of corporations had funding ratios
greater than one hundred percent. Id.; see also Pension Gap at Companies Eases Slightly,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at C3 (noting drop in percentage of underfunded
pensions).
93 Pension Funding Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 596 (2004).
94 See Hu, supra note 9.
95 Turtle Trader, If You Think the Enron Story Is About One Company- Think Again.
Enron Is About You- Your Retirement and Who Manages Your Money, at http://www.turtle-
trader.com/hall-of-shame.html (last visited July 30, 2004).
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was $145 million.9 6 Some pension funds, including the Arkansas
Teachers' pension fund and the California Public Employees' Retire-
ment System (Calpers) also invested in Enron's off-balance sheet part-
nerships or "special purpose entities." Calpers earned a twenty-three
percent return on the $250 million it contributed to Jedi I in 1993,
but had problems when it tried to reclaim its capital stake three years
later. Nevertheless, it converted its claim into a $500 million stake in a
new Raptor-style vehicle.
9 7
Institutional investors generally contribute to market volatility.
Since open-end investment companies are required to be sufficiently
liquid to be able to redeem shares on a daily basis,9 8 trading by mutual
funds significantly contributes to the severity and speed of market de-
clines.9 9 Although there are a wide variety of hedge funds and hedge
fund investment strategies, hedge funds focus on an absolute return
rather than benchmarking an index, and as a general matter their
trading activities are more aggressive than the activities of mutual
funds, utilizing short selling and leverage. 10 0 In the autumn of 1998,
the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. (LTCM)
due to a portfolio that was not as diversified as thought posed a sys-
temic threat to the global capital marketplace. 10 1
Momentum trading, one of the strategies employed by mutual
funds and hedge funds, predicts the behavior of the markets around
the world at the end of their trading day and then attempts to exploit
this prediction. This market timing strategy results in rapid trading
during the course of a single day.10 2 Such trading contributes to mar-
ket volatility and is inconsistent with any concept of a shareholder as
an owner of a corporation. Yet, such trading has been defended by
96 Id.
97 Richard A. Oppel,Jr., Employees'Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at Al. Similarly, large value and large growth as well as specialty
mutual funds had more than five percent of their assets in Worldcom when it col-
lapsed. See Frank W. Stanton, Funds that Got Walloped by WorldCom, MORNINGSTAR.COM,
Nov. 1, 2000, at http://news.momingstar.com/doc/news/0,2,83
22
,00.html.
98 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22, -24(a) (2000).
99 Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public
Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 240-46 (1988).
100 See GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 71, at 33-43.
101 See Paul N. Roth & Brian H. Fortune, Hedge Fund Regulation in the Aftermath of
Long-Term Capital Management, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 73,
at 83, 83-84.
102 SeeJames N. Benedict, Overview of Recent Regulatory and Private Proceedings Con-
cerning Market Timing and Other Related Activity in the Mutual Fund Industry, 1420 PLI/
CoRP. 35, 39 (2004).
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the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board as a contribution to mar-
ket liquidity.1 0 3
Although this Article is focused on speculative trading by institu-
tional investors, speculation by individual investors during the 1990s
bubble needs to at least be mentioned. Just as frenzied momentum
trading by institutions became fashionable, day trading by individual
investors became popular. Like their institutional big brothers, day
traders were individual investors, not registered as broker-dealers or
associated persons, who traded stock at a firm that allowed real time
access to exchanges and the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) . 1 04 Day
traders, whether they are institutions or individuals, attempt to make a
profit by executing intra-day trades to take advantage of small price
movements in stocks. They are not investors, but traders, holding
stocks for only hours, or even only seconds. 10 5 At the height of the
bull market it was estimated that there were about 7000 day traders
who accounted for approximately fifteen percent of Nasdaq's daily
volume. 106
Although the SEC staff did worry about violations of net capital,
record keeping, margin and short selling rules by broker-dealers al-
lowing day trading, the staff seemed more concerned about protect-
ing day traders themselves from fraud by the broker-dealers at which
they traded.10 7 Because day trading was online and took advantage of
pricing anomalies at the exchanges and Nasdaq, day trading may have
seemed to have some value from a market structure perspective. 108
103 See Editorial, The SEC's Expanding Empire, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2004, at A14.
104 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N, SPECIAL STUDY: REPORT OF EXAMINATIONS OF DAY-TRADING BROKER-DEALERS
(2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/daytrading.htm [hereinafter DAY TRAD-
INC STUDY].
105 Id.
106 Id. pt. III.A.
107 See id. The NASD similarly focused on risk to investors rather than trying to
stop day trading speculative market activity. See Self-Regulatory Organizations: Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change
and Amendment No. 1 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Ap-
proval of Amendment No. 2 Relating to the Opening of Day-Trading Accounts, Ex-
change Act Release No. 43,021, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,082 (July 10, 2000).
108 The SEC was prompted to move to decimalization because the conventional
one-eighth spread on over-the-counter trading was enforced by traders in violation of
the antitrust laws. See Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No.
37,542, 62 S.E.C. Dock. 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996). But the shift to decimals did not occur
until 2001. See Kate Kelly &Jeff Opdyke, Nasdaq to Complete Its Shift to Decimals with All
Stocks Priced in Dollars, Cents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at C9; Jeff D. Opdyke, NYSE
Adds Decimals, Subtracts Fractions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at Cl. Decimalization
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Further, the SEC generally focuses on investor protection from the
standpoint of disclosure regulation. So while the SEC showed some
appreciation for the danger posed by day traders, and it took some
enforcement actions against firms encouraging day trading, it did not
campaign against day trading itself. Similarly, the SEC did not cam-
paign against momentum or day trading by institutions.
It is very difficult to generalize about the trading practices of insti-
tutional investors because they are so diverse. Nevertheless, com-
plaints from the corporate community that institutions do not invest
for the long term, but have a trader's mentality, are long standing. 10 9
Institutions hold very large positions and it is difficult for them to be
nimble investors. Many rely on passive index strategies or investment
managers who they are unable to realistically properly supervise. The
foregoing facts suggest that such trading strategies are harmful not
only to the markets but to the beneficiaries of these funds. Further, it
is these beneficiaries that the SEC should be seeking to protect, rather
than the institutional investors.
II. MUTUAL FUND AND HEDGE FUND REFORMS
A. Trading Problems at Mutual Funds
The New York Attorney General kicked off a widespread investi-
gation into the mutual fund industry in early September 2003 by
bringing an action involving late trading, deceptive market timing and
sales practices by mutual funds dealing with a hedge fund against Ca-
nary Capital Partners, LLP. 1 ° Late trading is permitting a purchase
resulted in changes in day trading strategies. It became much more difficult to en-
gage in a strategy called "cutting the spread," which means buying stocks on a bid side
and selling immediately afterwards on the ask side for a small profit. SeeJens Clever,
DayTradingCoach.com, Daytrading Strategies: For the ShortTerm, at http://www.daytrad-
ingcoach.com/daytrading-articles-shortterm.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
109 See Carolyn Brancato & Michael Price, The Institutional Investor's Goals for Corpo-
rate Law in the Twenty-First Centuy, 25 DEL.J. CORP. L. 35, 44 (2000) ("No issue contin-
ues to polarize corporations and institutional investors more than 'short-termism'-
the notion that institutional investors are only speculators or traders .... ); Solomon
& Dicker, supra note 99, at 241 (noting that "major institutional investors view stocks
and futures as interchangeable instruments used for the purpose of implementing
short-term trading strategies designed to earn quick profits"); see also David Wessel,
Closing the Door: Two Economists Discuss the Wisdom of Exchange Controls for Emerging-Mar-
ket Countries, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 1997, at R21 (posing a question whether emerging
market countries should restrict the flow of short-term investments by institutional
investors).
110 See Complaint, State v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3,
2003) (No. 402830/2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/nys/
nyscanary90303cmp.pdf; http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-com-
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or redemption order received after the 4:00 p.m. pricing of a mutual
fund's net asset value. Market timing is the frequent buying and sell-
ing of mutual fund shares to take advantage of price disparities be-
tween a mutual fund's portfolio securities and the reflection of that
change in the fund's share price. The former is unlawful, the latter
not necessarily so, but it can nevertheless harm mutual fund share-
holders by giving traders a windfall at the expense of long-term
shareholders.111
The SEC was already working on mutual fund reform by the time
the New York Attorney General brought these cases. During 2003, the
SEC initiated sixteen rulemaking proceedings involving mutual
funds. 112 Further, since the mutual fund scandals broke, the SEC and
state regulators have taken enforcement action against nearly half of
the largest mutual fund companies.113 In addition to permitting im-
proper trading, the cases involved sales practice abuses and other mat-
ters. As the result of all of these problems, the SEC is engaged in
corporate governance and other reform of fund practices.
In 2001, at a time when there was debate over the corporate gov-
ernance of public companies because of Enron and other scandals,
the SEC determined to require the boards of investment companies to
have a majority of independent directors. At the time, there was no
apparent crisis of confidence with respect to mutual fund governance,
but the SEC was generally making a bid to regulate corporate govern-
ance and board composition, which resulted in the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC accomplished its goal of mandating that an
investment company board be composed of a majority of independent
plaint.pdf; Ann Davis et al., Fund Probe Turns to Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003,
at C]; see also Kip Betz & Rachel McTague, Spitzer Brings Criminal Charges, SEC Sues Over
Alleged Late Trading in Funds, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2018, 2018 (Dec. 8, 2003)
(discussing the Canary case).
111 See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,714-15 & nn.6-7
(Dec. 24, 2003); see also Stephen J. Crimmins et al., The Mutual Fund Crisis-Beginning
to See a Resolution, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 349, 349 (Feb. 23, 2004) (describing
late trading and market timing, as well as their potential effects).
112 See Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt., the Budget and Int'l Sec., Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (testimony of Paul F. Roye, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt.,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
tsl 10303pfroral.htm.
113 See Paul F. Roye, Mutual Fund Industry at a Crossroads; The Losers, the Win-
ners, and the Spirit of Reform, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks Before the ICI General
Membership Meeting (May 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch052004pfr.htm.
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directors by conditioning the operation of its exemptive rules under
the Investment Company Act upon such a structure. Further, the SEC
required the independent directors to select and nominate the
board's independent directors, and to hire new counsel with no sub-
stantial ties to a fund's manager. 114 Although the SEC's method for
imposing its corporate governance ideas on mutual funds was not
challenged by the fund industry, in part because many funds already
had a majority of independent directors, the SEC's authority for
changing the statutory standard of forty percent independent direc-
tors to more than fifty percent could have been questioned since the
statute grants a mutual fund the right to have up to sixty percent of its
directors be non-independent. 115
Since the autumn of 2003 numerous additional reform proposals
have been generated by the SEC and a number of mutual fund legisla-
tive proposals have been floated in Congress. 116 Some of these pro-
posals relate to substantive changes in the way in which fund shares
are purchased and sold. SEC proposals and new rules include impos-
ing a mandatory two percent redemption fee on sales made within five
days of a purchase,1 17 imposing a "hard close" on share pricing,118
eliminating 12b-1 fees, 119 eliminating the payment of soft dollars
120
and a variety of improved disclosure regulations. 121 A bill sponsored
114 Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3737-39 (Jan. 16, 2001).
115 See W. Hardy Callcott, Comments on S7-03-04 (Apr. 11, 2004), at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/whcallcottO4112004.htm; Complaint, Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC (D.D.C. filed Sept. 2, 2004) (No. 04-CU-01522), available at http://
www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/issues/partylitigation.ht.
116 See Rachel McTague, Outlook 2004: Mutual Funds at Center of Arena; Reform a
Good Bet, but Scope Unclear, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 149, 149 (Jan. 26, 2004).
117 Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,375, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004).
118 Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003).
119 Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 26,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 9726 (proposed Mar. 1,
2004).
120 Id; see Karen Damato & Judith Burns, Cleaning up the Fund Industry, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 5, 2004, at RI (noting proposals to eliminate or restrict "soft dollars").
121 Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,287, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402 (pro-
posed Dec. 17, 2003) (proposing to require open-end management investment com-
panies to disclose the risks of the frequent purchases and redemption of investment
company shares and the investment company's procedures in this respect); Request
for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of Mutual Fund Transaction Costs,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,313, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,820 (Dec. 24, 2003);
Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
by Senator Kerry would establish an independent regulatory organiza-
tion or mutual fund oversight board for investment companies. 122
The SEC also embarked upon some far-reaching reforms of mutual
fund corporate governance.
Effective October 5, 2004, every mutual fund and adviser to a mu-
tual fund must adopt and implement written policies and procedures
designed to prevent violations of the federal securities laws and must
appoint a chief compliance officer (CCO) who will have overall re-
sponsibility for the management of a fund complex's compliance pro-
gram. 123 Although some of the required provisions of such a
compliance policy specifically relate to the market timing and late
trading abuses by funds uncovered by the SEC, the requirements go
far beyond these matters. The CCO must report directly to the mu-
tual fund board and meet in executive session annually with the
board, and must furnish the board with a written annual report on the
operation of the fund's policies and procedures and those of its ser-
vice providers. A fund's board of directors must approve the designa-
tion and compensation (including bonuses of the CCO) even though
the SEC contemplates that the CCO will normally be an employee of
the fund's adviser or management company. Further, the CCO is pro-
tected from coercion, manipulation, misleading or fraudulently-influ-
encing activity by the officers, directors or employees of the fund, its
adviser or its principal underwriter.
The SEC has determined that any fund relying on any of its ex-
emptive rules have a board comprised of at least seventy-five percent
independent directors, and further, that the chairman of the board be
an independent director. A further new requirement is that fund di-
Companies, Investment Company Release No. 26,383, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,752 (proposed
Mar. 17, 2004) (proposing amendments to improve the disclosure provided by regis-
tered management investment companies regarding their portfolio managers); Dis-
closure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,464, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,262 (June 14, 2004) (requiring open-end management
investment companies to provide enhanced disclosure regarding breakpoint dis-
counts on front-end sales loads); Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advi-
sory Contracts by Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June 30, 2004) (improving disclosure by
investment companies about how their boards of directors evaluate and approve in-
vestment advisory contracts).
122 Bill to Prevent the Practice of Late Trading by Mutual Funds, and for Other
Purposes, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003). Such a body would be similar to the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board established by Sarbanes-Oxley.
123 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,720-22 (Dec. 24,
2003).
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rectors perform an evaluation, at least once annually, of the effective-
ness of the board and its committees, and explicit authority is given to
the independent directors to hire employees and others to help them
fulfill their fiduciary duties. 124 This new rule has been controversial.
Members of both parties in Congress endorsed the idea of an inde-
pendent chairman, but other congressmen opposed the idea.12 5 Two
commissioners dissented from the adoption of the proposed rule.
1 26
Since approximately eighty percent of investment companies now
have a board chairman who is an officer of the fund's adviser, the
SEC's rule will work a significant change in mutual fund govern-
ance.1 27 Strong opposition to this rule has sparked an action for a
declaratory judgment declaring the rule invalid as beyond the SEC's
statutory authority and in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act.128
There may be a mismatch between the trading abuses by mutual
funds and the corporate governance reforms adopted by the SEC. Al-
though some of these reforms, particularly the requirement that
funds employ a CCO, may assure against violations of the federal se-
curities laws, it is unclear whether all of the trading abuses were actu-
ally illegal. Further, there is little evidence that a fund with a majority
of independent directors and an independent chairman will better
comply with legal requirements. 129 In any event, none of these re-
forms are designed to regulate the investment practices of mutual
funds or their own speculative trading activities which may contribute
to market volatility.
124 Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380-81 (Aug. 2, 2004).
125 Compare, e.g.,John Sununu et al., Comment on S-7-03-04 (Apr. 7, 2004) (oppos-
ing the proposal), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s 7 03 4 /s7O 3O4-
157.pdf, with Michael G. Oxley et al., Comment on S-7-03-04 (May 20, 2004) (asking
for adoption of the proposal), available at http://ww.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s70304/s70304-157.pdf.
126 Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,390-93 (dissent of Com-
missioners Glassman and Atkins).
127 Id. at 46,391 n.25 (dissent of Commissioners Glassman and Atkins).
128 Complaint, Chamber of Commerce v. SEC (D.D.C. filed Sept. 2, 2004) (No. 04-
CV-01522), available at http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/issues/partylitiga-
tion.htm; see Kristen French, Thomson Corp., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Challenges SEC
on Rule, Sept. 3, 2004, available at http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/
20040903102.html.
129 See Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,390-93 (dissent of
Commissioners Glassman and Atkins).
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B. Hedge Fund Regulation
The enforcement, regulatory and legislative activity with regard
to mutual funds, has opened the door on the question of whether
hedge funds should be registered with the SEC and/or regulated in
some way. This is because a high percentage of the enforcement cases
brought against mutual funds involved trading by hedge funds.
Hedge funds have long posed a challenge to the SEC because they are
unregulated.1 30 They tend to be entrepreneurial and can generate
large profits for their promoters and investors. Since hedge funds are
essentially private investment funds, the success of the hedge fund in-
dustry raises questions as to whether the Investment Company Act is
too restrictive, resulting in significant pools of money escaping from
its reach, or alternatively, whether the growth of hedge funds poses an
undue risk to investors and markets because they are unregulated.
The SEC, on its own or in conjunction with other federal agen-
cies, has repeatedly studied hedge funds from the perspective of
whether investors in such funds need better protection and whether
hedge funds pose a systemic risk to the public securities markets. 31
One of the developments that has persuaded the SEC to finally force
hedge funds to register with the SEC is that much of the recent
growth in the hedge fund industry has come from investments by in-
stitutions such as pension plans, endowments and foundations look-
ing for new investments during the bear market which followed the
bursting of the stock market bubble of the late 1990s.13 2 Thus, the
beneficiaries of these investors are exposed to the risks of hedge fund
trading.'33
Among the SEC staffs more serious concerns with regard to the
agency's lack of regulatory oversight over hedge funds are that the
SEC is unable to detect fraud and other misconduct at an early
stage,13 4 there is no independent check on a hedge fund adviser's val-
uation of a fund's portfolio securities, 3 5 and the conflicts of interest
which hedge fund advisers have may not be properly disclosed. 136 Ac-
cordingly, the staff recommended that the Commission consider re-
quiring all hedge fund advisers to register under the Investment
130 Nevertheless, numerous enforcement cases have been brought against them
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities law.
131 See GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 71, app. A.
132 Id. at 43-44.
133 Id. at 82.
134 Id. at 76.
135 Id. at 79.
136 Id. at 83.
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Advisers Act. 137 More intriguing was the suggestion that the SEC issue
a concept release to explore the wider use of hedge fund investment
strategies by investment companies.
38
On the basis of the staff's recommendations, the SEC adopted a
new rule requiring the registration of hedge funds as investment advis-
ers.139 Two commissioners dissented from this rule's adoption, argu-
ing that there was not an adequate basis for such registration, and
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan was cool to the
idea.1 40 It is therefore unlikely that a comprehensive regime for the
regulation of hedge funds, comparable to the regulation of invest-
ment companies, will be put in place at this time.
III. SPECULATION AND LEVERAGE
A. Securities Law Provisions Regarding Margin, Short Selling,
Manipulation and Derivatives Trading
The Exchange Act was based on the premise that stock market
speculation was inherently evil. President Roosevelt asserted in a mes-
sage to Congress in February 1934:
[O]utside the field of legitimate investment, naked speculation has
been made far too alluring and far too easy for those who could and
for those who could not afford to gamble.
Such speculation has run the scale from the individual who has
risked his pay envelop [e] or his meager savings on a margin transac-
tion involving stocks with whose true value he was wholly unfamiliar,
to the pool of individuals or corporations with large resources, often
not their own, which sought by manipulation to raise or depress
market quotations far out of line with reason, all of this resulting in
137 Id. at 89. Some ancillary recommendations were also made, such as requiring
a specially designed brochure to be provided to hedge fund clients and rulemaking
with regard to valuation procedures, but instead of recommending a full-blown regu-
latory regime, the staff report suggests that the industry expand and develop best
practice guidelines. Id. at 97-101.
138 Id. at 103-06.
139 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
140 Id. at 72,089 (dissent of Commissioners Glassman and Atkins); see Deborah
Brewster, Opposition Grows to SEC Hedge Fund Plan, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at 24;
Miklos Nagy, Investors Don't Want More Regulation: Regulators Eager to 'Help' People Who
Don't Need Help, FIN. POST, Feb. 23, 2004, at FP6; Editorial, SEC Crime Spree, WALL ST.J.,
Sept. 27, 2004, at A18. Perhaps this is because hedge funds have been useful in per-
mitting banks to lay off some of their risks. See The SEC's Expanding Empire, supra note
103 (commenting on the financial function of hedge funds in diversifying risk across
the market).
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loss to the average investor, who is of necessity personally
uninformed. 14 1
After James Landis was appointed a Commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission, which administered the Securities Act until the
SEC was created, he recommended a bill to regulate stock exchanges
to a committee chaired by Assistant Commerce SecretaryJohn Dickin-
son. 142 The "irreducible minima" of such a bill in Landis's view would
be a requirement of periodic annual reports by public companies; re-
ports by corporate insiders of their stock dealings; "police regulation"
of specialists, brokerage houses, customers' men, pool operations,
shortselling, manipulative transactions such as wash sales and
matched orders; and regulation of the over-the-counter market.143 In-
deed, the SEC was created to be the policeman of Wall Street, a regu-
lator of the stock exchanges and securities industry, and the Exchange
Act was designed primarily to control speculators, manipulators and
insider traders. 14 4 The most significant tools given to the SEC in this
regard, in addition to compelled registration of stock exchanges and
broker-dealers, were provisions regarding margin lending, short sell-
ing, manipulation and derivatives trading. These means were sup-
posed to prevent another 1929 speculative bull market. One of the
questions this Article is intended to raise is why these statutory mecha-
nisms failed to prevent another speculative bull market in 1999.
The margin requirements, set forth in section seven of the Ex-
change Act, were designed to prevent the "excessive use of credit for
the purchase or carrying of securities." 145 The Federal Reserve Board
was accorded the responsibility for prescribing regulations with re-
spect to the amount of securities credit that could be extended and
maintained by financial institutions in an amount not greater than
either fifty-five percent of the current market price of the security, or
one hundred percent of the lowest market price during the preceding
thirty-six calendar months but not more than seventy-five percent of
the current market price.1 4 6 The SEC was given the responsibility for
then enforcing the margin regulations. When the Exchange Act was
being debated in Congress, some thought buying securities on credit
141 S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-2 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 1 (1934).
142 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 79-80 (3d ed. 2003).
143 Id. at 81-82.
144 See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409 (1990).
145 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (2000).
146 Id. Regulation T, applicable to broker-dealers, is 12 C.F.R. § 220.12 (2004).
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should be prohibited,1 47 others thought that the margin require-
ments should be fixed, but as adopted the establishment of margin
rates was left to the Federal Reserve Board.1 48
The Congress which passed the Exchange Act believed that the
trading of securities on credit could lead to significant problems in
the national economy as well as the financial markets because credit-
financed securities speculation diverted resources from more produc-
tive uses in commerce, industry and agriculture. 149 Such activities cre-
ated or reinforced stock market bubbles and led many people
"perhaps drawn in by the exuberance of the market" to assume securi-
ties positions of undue risk.
150
Between 1936 and 1974, the Federal Reserve Board changed mar-
gin ratios twenty-five times, with levels ranging from a low of forty per-
cent in the late 1930s to a high of one hundred percent just after
World War II, but generally kept ratios between fifty and seventy per-
cent. 51 In 1974, the Federal Reserve Board set margin rates at fifty
percent and it has not changed them since. 152 During and after the
bull market of the late 1960s, when margin rates were high, the mar-
gin regulations were taken so seriously that there were criminal prose-
cutions for their violation. 153 In 1984, however, the Federal Reserve
Board recommended that margin regulation by the Federal Reserve
Board be abolished for two reasons: first, the primary purpose of such
regulation should become to ensure the integrity of the marketplace
by seeing that there is protection against significant credit loss for bro-
147 STAFF OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., A REVIEW.AND EvAL-
UATION OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS 3 (1984) [hereinafter MARGIN STUDY].
148 SELIGMAN, supra note 142, at 93-94, 97-98.
149 MARGIN STUDY, supra note 147, at 3.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 48; see 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OP-
ERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 8:3, at 8-11 & nn.l-2 (2d ed.
2002).
152 Hu, supra note 9, at 798.
153 See, e.g., United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commerciale E d'Investimenti, 325
F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding Regulation T applicable to foreign banks);
United States v. Whorl, Litigation Release No. 4478 (Nov. 24, 1969). Further, viola-
tions of the margin rules were actionable in private lawsuits. See, e.g., Junger v. Hertz,
Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (finding existence
of a private cause of action for a violation of § 7(c), but denying broker liability in this
case); Newman v. Pershing & Co., 412 F. Supp. 463, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding
an "implied right of action" for private plaintiffs against creditors for violations of
§ 7); Remarv. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949) (construing
§ 7(c) as allowing a private cause of action). This principle was later abandoned. See
Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding no civil action
available under § 7, irrespective whether the case arises under Regulation U or T).
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kers, banks and other lenders; and second, stock-based futures and
options contracts had become close substitutes for margin leverage
and, therefore, if the margin regulations were to be maintained, mar-
gins in the derivatives markets should be significandy raised. This task
should be done either by self-regulatory organizations or an inter-
agency task force involving the SEC and the CFTC. 15 4
Thereafter, despite evidence of speculation and volatility in the
stock market in the middle and late 1980sI 55 and the late 1990s, Con-
gress did nothing with regard to this recommendation and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board did nothing with regard to margin rates. 156 While
admittedly, in view of widespread leverage through derivatives trading,
raising margin rates might have been a futile gesture, it would at least
have been a gesture, a warning to investors and the financial commu-
nity. The real issue, however, is whether the kind of leverage that now
exists in the market is salutary. Should federal law be amended so
that margins on stocks and derivatives can be harmonized, and should
the SEC or some other federal agency be given the task of controlling
the amount of securities credit in the financial markets?
The Exchange Act's bans on short selling were supposed to pre-
vent precipitous market declines. They did not do so during the stock
market crash of 1987, and they have become somewhat obsolete as a
result of derivatives trading and decimalization. Section 10 of the Ex-
change Act 157 gave the SEC the ability to prohibit or regulate short
selling and the SEC adopted Rule l0a-1 for the purpose of permitting
short selling in an advancing market, but preventing short selling
from driving a market down or accelerating a declining market. 158
For years, some have argued for the elimination of the short sale
154 Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, to the HonorableJesse Helms, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry, United States Senate (Jan. 11, 1985) (copy on file with
author).
155 See infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text.
156 It cannot be argued that the Federal Reserve Board was unaware of the stock
market bubble of the late 1990s. In July 1999, the Federal Reserve Board's model
gave a reading that the Standard & Poor's 500 was almost fifty percent overvalued
versus its thirty-four percent overvaluation in 1987,just before the 1987 market crash.
Chairman Alan Greenspan then referred in a speech in August 1999 to the extraordi-
nary increase in stock prices and the possibility of a "bursting bubble." Hu, supra note
9, at 788-89.
157 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (a) (1) (2000).
158 Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530
(Dec. 28, 1976).
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rules. 159 The SEC recently has changed the way in which the short
sale rules operate.' 60
Just as the short sale provisions of the Exchange Act were sup-
posed to prevent the "bear raids" which were blamed for the 1929
stock market crash, 161 the antimanipulation provisions of sections 9
and 10 of the Exchange Act were supposed to prevent the infamous
"stock market pools" of the 1920s.16 2 The closest analogues to these
pools since the enactment of the Exchange Act were the leveraged
buyoutjunk bond deals engineered by Drexel Burnham Lambert and
Michael Milken in the 1980s163 and the underwriting practices of the
1990s.164 Instead of attacking either of these operations under the
anti-manipulation provisions, the SEC utilized the insider trading
prohibitions.165 Further, with respect to questionable underwriting
practices of the 1990s, the SEC was upstaged by the New York Attor-
ney General.' 66
When the Exchange Act was passed, the SEC was given plenary
authority over options trading, and it continues to be unlawful for op-
tions trading to occur in contravention of any SEC regulations.'
6 7
Prior to 1973, options trading was conducted over the counter and
options were not standardized. In 1973, the SEC authorized the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) to trade standardized, ex-
159 See Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-
the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17, 100-01 (1986); David C. Worley, The
Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1255 (1990).
160 Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50,103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6,
2004).
161 See 7 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3200-04 & n.213
(3d ed. 2003).
162 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Fi-
nancial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 503 (1991); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16:
Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 439-49
(1991); Thel, supra note 144, at 424-61.
163 See generally Margaret M. Blair & Robert E. Litan, Corporate Leverage and Lever-
aged Buyouts in the Eighties, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 43 (John
B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990) (analyzing trends behind corporate leverage
and leveraged buyouts in the 1980s).
164 See Richard W. Painter, Standing up to Wall Street (and Congress), 101 MIcH. L.
REv. 1512, 1517 (2003); Arthur E. Wilmarth,Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL.
L. RFv. 215, 326.
165 See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608, 615 (2d Cir.
1994); Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
166 Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 93, 102 (2002).
167 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)-(g) (2000) (amended 2004).
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change listed options.168 The rapid growth of options trading during
the 1970s and the development of certain questionable trading prac-
tices prompted the SEC to initiate an investigation and study of the
listed options markets in October 1977. The SEC was concerned
about (1) the ability of SRO surveillance systems to detect or prevent
fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative activity in the trading of op-
tions and underlying stock; (2) the adequacy of SEC and SRO rules to
prevent fraud and manipulation in options trading; (3) the role of
options trading in the national market system; and (4) the develop-
ment of standards by which to measure options trading programs. 169
Accordingly, the SEC conducted a comprehensive study of the options
markets and then published a report recommending a large number
of new regulations with respect to surveillance of the options markets,
trading practices, selling practices and customer protection, and bro-
ker-dealer capital adequacy rules. 170 The focus of this study was on
customer protection and the prevention of manipulation. The study
did not cover "the effect of options on the trading in the underlying
stocks or on the capital raising functions of the securities markets" or
"whether there should be changes in the present system of credit reg-
ulation" for options trading. 171 Had the SEC decided to more severely
limit options trading its actions probably would have been effectively
nullified by trading in financial futures regulated by the CFTC, a com-
peting regulator. Turf battles between the SEC and the CFTC during
the last quarter of the twentieth century, aggravated by their differing
congressional oversight committees, and the threat to both securities
and commodities exchanges posed by unregulated derivatives trading,
made any effective curtailment of derivatives trading and the leverage
they involved practically impossible. 172
The SEC, like the Federal Reserve Board, was not blind to the
dangerous market conditions of the 1990s. Yet, both agencies failed
to act to prevent the stock market bubble from growing bigger and
bigger. It has been persuasively argued that both agencies had an un-
168 In re Application of the Chicago Brand Options Exchange, Inc., Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9985, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 79,213, at 82,669 (Feb. 1, 1973).
169 See Investigation of Standardized Options Trading and Regulation of Such
Trading; Proposed Restriction of Further Expansion of Pilot Options Trading Pro-
grams, and Commission Disapproval Proceedings, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 14,056, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,706, 56,708-09 (Oct. 27, 1977).
170 See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., RE-
PORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1978).
171 Id. at viii-ix.
172 See Markham, supra note 17, 341-66.
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reasonable faith in the superiority of common stocks as an investment
asset class and the magic of time diversification. 173 Others might ar-
gue that these agencies had been captured by the industries they were
supposed to regulate. 174 Clearly another factor is that Congress had
no interest in pricking a feel-good stock market bubble that might
enhance the election chances of its members. 75
B. Past Crises
1. The 1987 Market Crash
Monday, October 19, 1987, was the blackest day in Wall Street
history. The 508 point drop in the DowJones Industrial Averages on
a record high volume of over 600 million shares was an even steeper
decline in stock prices than Black Thursday of October 29, 1929. The
New York Stock Exchange came very close to closing on Tuesday, Oc-
tober 20, 1987, and probably would have done so but for the interven-
tion of the Federal Reserve Board and the seemingly miraculous
rebound in the market at midday.176 Market crashes are a reaction to
grim economic realities finally emerging after a period of unjustified
euphoria. Prior to the crash, there had been a five-year bull market in
the face of twin trade and budget deficits, a low savings rate, mounting
debt to foreign investors due to oil prices and a decline in the value of
the dollar. Immediately prior to the crash, merger and acquisition
173 Hu, supra note 9, at 817.
174 See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS &J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
21-33 (1981) (analyzing public choice theory and its effects on the regulatory pro-
cess); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 909, 948-49 (1994); Jonathan R.
Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System,
1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315. But see SELIGMAN, supra note 142, at xix (stating that the SEC
is not captured by the industries it regulates).
175 It is widely acknowledged that stock options were one of the primary causes of
the 1990s stock market bubble. See Gary S. Becker, Options Are Useful-But Only If
they're Used ight, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 26; Mara Der Hovanesian, The Buyback
Boomerang, Bus. WK., Sept. 23, 2002, at 98; David Wessel, Why the Bad Guys of the Boar-
droom Emerged En Masse, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at Al; see also Robert W. Hamilton,
The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1, 29-71 (2003) (noting
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's failure to address the issue of expensing stock options). Yet,
when the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) attempted to change the
accounting for stock options so that they would have to be reflected as an expense,
Congress threatened to abolish the FASB and the SEC also backed off of this reform.
See ARTHUR LEvrrr, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE
AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNow 105-11 (2002).
176 SeeJames B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, Terrible Tuesday: How the Stock Market
Almost Disintegrated a Day After the Crash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1987, at Al.
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activity had become frenzied, involving the break up and liquidation
of many major industrial companies and the financial leveraging of
assets to finance recapitalizations. An immediate cause of the crash
was proposed congressional action to destroy takeover activity by elim-
inating the interest deduction on certain junk bonds. 177
The culprit of market volatility most immediately identified after
the crash was "program trading." This inexact term covered a variety
of computer-assisted trading strategies involving derivative products,
particularly stock index futures. All of these strategies involved efforts
to hedge against stock market risk, but functioned during the crash to
increase a market decline. Numerous studies were conducted after
the crash by government and exchange bodies178 which agreed upon
little other than the prices of stocks during the crash were being estab-
lished by the derivative markets in Chicago instead of the stock ex-
changes in New York and elsewhere. A presidential committee
recommended that one government agency regulate intermarket is-
sues and suggested that the Federal Reserve Board should do so, but
Alan Greenspan declined this dubious honor.179
After these reports were issued, the President appointed a Work-
ing Group on Financial Markets comprised of the Chairmen of the
SEC, CFTC and Federal Reserve Board, and the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to agree within sixty days on intermarket mechanisms to prevent
177 See Thomas E. Ricks, Ruder Says SEC Plans to Examine Role of 'Takeover Stocks' in
Market's Crash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1987, at A6.
178 The first study to be published was one commissioned by the NYSE before the
crash. NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IM-
PACT ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987). The next day, a committee of inquiry
appointed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange published a report. MERTON H.
MILLER ET AL., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE
CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE TO EXAMINE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987
(1987). A blue-ribbon presidential committee headed by Nicholas Brady was then
published. NICHOLAS BRADY ET AL., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MAR-
KET MECHANISMS (CCH Special Report No. 1267, 1988). The SEC issued a staff re-
port, Dw. OF MARKET REGULATION, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK (1988), and so did the CFTC Division of Economic Analysis and Division of
Trading and Markets, FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND MARKETS DURING
OCTOBER 1987 TO THE U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (1988). The
U.S. General Accounting Office also rushed to issue a report. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, FINANCIAL MARKETS: PRELIMINARY OBSER-
VATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH (1988).
179 The Turbulence in the Financial Markets Last October, the Functioning of Our Finan-
cial Markets During that Period, and Proposals for Structural and Regulatory Reforms: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 87 (1988)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys.).
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another crash. 180 But this working group was unable to agree to rais-
ing margin rates or otherwise addressing stock market leverage.'8 1
The only concrete proposal put forward in its report was that a circuit
breaker mechanism should be established. 182 Not surprisingly, the
only recommendation of the various groups that studied the market
crash which came to fruition was the establishment of circuit breakers.
The Working Group specifically proposed an intermarket trading halt
of one hour if the DowJones industrial average should fall 250 points
below its previous day's closing value and for a two-hour halt if the
Dow Jones industrial average should fall 400 points.18 3 The NYSE
then put a circuit breaker mechanism in place.1 84
2. The LTCM Collapse
LTCM was an investment vehicle for a number of hedge funds.
Its principals included a former vice-chairman and bond trading chief
at Salomon Brothers, Inc., and two Nobel laureates in economics, and
it began with a capital base of five billion dollars. 8 5 Its portfolio was
extraordinarily large and extraordinarily risky. Approximately eighty
percent of LTCM's balance sheet positions were in treasury securities
of the major industrial countries and this portfolio, as of the end of
1997, was leveraged twenty-eight to one. 186 But its off-balance sheet
180 White House Issues Order Creating Working Group on Financial Markets, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 452, 452 (Mar. 25, 1988).
181 SEC Chairman David Ruder dissented from the Report on this ground. See
Exec. Order No. 12,631, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1989), reprinted as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2000) (establishing a working group on financial markets); see also Andre R. Fiebig,
Regulatory Cooperation for Effectiveness and Compliance: Strategies for Joint Action Among
Securities, Banking and Antitrust Regulators, 91 Am. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 223 (1997)
(discussing the importance of transnational regulatory communication); Jerry W.
Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures Industry-History and
Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 59, 119-20 (1991) (noting the failure of the working group to
address the issue of merging in its efforts to regulate); Ambrose Evans-Pritchard,
"Plunge Team" Ready to Spring into Action, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 2, 1998, at
4 (describing the team of financial officials set up to avoid another stock market
crash).
182 WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., INTERIM REPORT DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT
(1988).
183 Id.
184 Exchange Act Release No. 26,198, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,637 (Oct. 24, 1988); see also
Brandon C. Becker & David L. Underhill, Market Reform Proposals and Actions, in ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY: BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 193 (1989); Thomas E. Ricks,
U.S. Regulators Clear 'Circuit Breakers' to Halt Trading After Big Market Drop, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 1988, at A18 (discussing the approval and effect of "circuit breaker" plans).
185 Roth & Fortune, supra note 101, at 85 n.4.
186 Id. at 85.
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activities and its use of derivatives made its activities much more lever-
aged and risky. By August 31, 1998, LTCM had approximately $1.4
trillion in notional value of derivatives off-balance sheet on a capital
base of approximately $ 2.3 billion.)8 7 When Russia devalued the ru-
ble and declared a debt moratorium on August 17, 1998, LTCM be-
came highly vulnerable to the market conditions which ensued and by
September it had lost almost fifty percent of its equity.188
The Federal Reserve Board was required to intervene because of
the systemic threat which the collapse of LTCM would have posed to
the capital markets. Although the Federal Reserve Board did not lend
money to LTCM itself, it facilitated a private sector recapitalization of
LTCM composed of fourteen banks and securities firms which were
LTCM's largest creditors.18 9
As was the case with the 1987 stock market crash, a number of
governmental, international and private sector groups were convened
to study the financial crisis, several bills were introduced in Congress,
and little happened. 190 The general consensus of these various re-
ports was that LTCM's counterparties took undue risks and ignored
some of their own credit risk parameters, but that regulators should
rely on transparency and market forces to improve risk management
by institutional investors. The "regulatory gap" between the SEC and
the CFTC was noted, and homage was paid to greater regulatory coor-
dination, 191 but regulation of hedge funds was not recommended. A
working group report from members of the U.S. Treasury Depart-
187 Id.
188 Id. at 85-86.
189 Id. at 86-87.
190 See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND PRACrICES FOR BANKS' INTER-
ACTIONS WITH HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS (1999), available at http://www.bis.
org/publ/bcbs46.pdf; COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP, IMPROVING
COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999), available at http://www.default
risk.com/pp-other_08.htm; IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER
HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS (1999), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/
pdf/IOSCONEWS34.pdf; MANAGED FUNDS ASS'N, HEDGE FUNDS: ISSUES FOR PUBLIC
POLICY MAYERS (1999), available at http://www.mfainfo.org/whatsnew/Hedge%20
Funds.doc; PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999), available at http://www.
treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf; SNIPER MKT. TURING, SOUND PRAC-
TICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS (2000), available at http://www.sniper.at/literate/
hedge-funds_003.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUES-
TORS, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER AT-
TENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK (1999); see also H.R. 3483, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2924,
106th Cong. (1999); S. 1968, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing bills to increase the
regulation of hedge funds).
191 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 190, at 24.
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ment, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the CFTC and others specifically
declined to recommend the direct regulation of unregulated hedge
funds or derivatives dealers on the grounds that regulation would
drive these entities offshore.
1 9 2
It can be anticipated that many of the same actors, and particu-
larly the Federal Reserve Board, which have ignored the systemic and
investor protection threats posed by leverage in the past will object to
the SEC's truly very modest proposal to require hedge fund registra-
tion. But unregulated hedge funds probably pose a greater risk to the
markets than any other institutional investors, and to the extent that
pension funds and other institutions are increasing their investments
in hedge funds, an evaluation of the soundness of the country's retire-
ment systems cannot be made without a better ability on the part of
regulators to evaluate hedge fund activities.
C. Underwriting in the 1990s
The way in which underwritings were conducted in the 1990s was
highly questionable. Practices not unlike the pools of the 1920s have
come to light, in part because of actions initiated by the New York
Attorney General after the bubble, 193 which the SEC should have at
least wondered about. The enormous premiums at which many tech-
nology offerings traded immediately after going public turned out to
be based on such problematic practices as laddering, flipping and
spinning. 194 Institutional investors, particularly hedge funds, as well
as favored officers of prospective clients, benefitted from allocations at
the IPO offering price and their ability to sell out at a significant pre-
192 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 190, at 32-41.
193 See Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address, Enron and Its Aftermath, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
801, 812 (2002); Charles Gasparino, New York Sues Telecom Executives over Stock Profits,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2002, at Al; Patrick McGeehan, E-Mail Gaps May Mean Fines for Big
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C4; Dan Carney et al., The Street's New Cleanup Crew,
Bus. WK. ONLINE, June 3, 2002, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
jun2002/nf2002063_8860.htm.
194 Laddering is an agreement by an IPO investor to purchase additional shares of
stock on the open market at an escalating series of inflated prices. Therese H. May-
nard, Law Matters. Lawyers Matter, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1501, 1514 n.34 (2002). Spinning is
a term used by Wall Street to describe an underwriter's practice of allocating shares in
hot IPOs to influential individual investors "as the quid pro quo for future underwrit-
ing business." Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or
Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2023, 2028 (2002). Flipping is the term
used to describe the conduct of a CEO who sells shares after receiving an allocation of
shares in a hot IPO. Id. at 2027.
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mium. 1 95 While there have been after-the-fact prosecutions for some
of these underwriting practices,1 96 the only significant action the SEC
took before the bubble burst was the adoption of Regulation FD to
curb leaks to research analysts. 197 A proposal by the NASD to estab-
lish a new rule on Trading in Hot Equity Offerings 198 went through a
three-year comment process and was not finally adopted until Octo-
ber 24, 2003.199 Although the participation of research analysts in un-
derwritings became the subject of enforcement actions by the New
York Attorney General2 00 and the SEC,201 less attention was paid to
the operation of underwriting syndicates and the manner in which
institutional investors profited from these underwritings.
Yet the excesses in the initial public offering market as much as
any other development in the securities markets fueled the 1990s bub-
ble. While it was not the SEC's responsibility or mandate to prevent
issuers with few assets, no earnings and no real prospect of ever having
195 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2416, at *1 (D.D.C.Jan.
29, 2002); MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d
251 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Randall Smith & Charles Gasparino, Research Pact: All-in-One
Deal?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2002, at Cl.
196 See, e.g., Credit Suisse, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2416.
197 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, 64
Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999). In the 1980s the SEC also attacked Michael
Milken and other risk arbitrageurs under the insider trading prohibitions rather than
analyzing the junk bond buy out craze as manipulative. See supra note 165.
198 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Amendment Nos. 3 and 4 to
a Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Re-
garding Restrictions on the Purchase and Sale of Initial Public Offerings, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 46,942, 67 Fed. Reg. 75,889 (Dec. 10, 2002).
199 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment Nos. I Through 4 Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 5 Thereto by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Restrictions on the Purchases and Sales of Initial
Public Offerings of Equity Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 48,701, 68 Fed. Reg.
62,126 (Oct. 31, 2003).
200 See Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch to Pay Big Fine, Increase Oversight of Analysts,
WALL ST.J., May 22, 2002, at Al; see also Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02/410522
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 21, 2002) (settlement agreement), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/investors/merrill-agreement.pdf; Ann Davis, Bear Stearns Used Analyst to
Tout IPO Despite Pact with Regulators, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2003, at Al.
201 See Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firmu and Their Research Ana-
lysts: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters.,
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n), available at http://financialserices.house.gov/media/pdf/0731011u.pdf;
Randall Smith et al., Record Payment Settles Conflict-of-Interest Charges, WALL ST. J., Apr.
29, 2003, at Al.
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earnings from going public, it was the SEC's responsibility to regulate
underwriting practices, and many of the practices employed in the
late 1990s were illegal. It is interesting that few Sarbanes-Oxley re-
forms were addressed in any way to underwriting practices or the role
of institutional investors in these offerings.
D. Should Anything Be Done to Dampen Speculation?
Since the technology bubble burst in 2000, the SEC has had so
many challenges and was given so many added responsibilities by
Sarbanes-Oxley that it may seem inappropriate to suggest that further
work is required to prevent future stock market bubbles. But the sad
fact is that neither the SEC nor the Federal Reserve Board nor any
other financial regulatory agencies made a strenuous effort in the late
1990s to dampen the rampant speculation which was occurring. The
lessons of the 1920s were apparently forgotten. The financial regula-
tory agencies were either too myopic, too weak or too timid to speak
out or take action against a runaway stock market.20 2 According to
one scholar, the financial agencies were themselves victims of irra-
tional exuberance. 203 Although they had some tools for dealing with
stock market excesses, the most important of these tools, margin regu-
lation, had been compromised a long time before by the development
of derivatives. To the extent that anyone thought to fill the "regula-
tory gap" between the SEC and CFITC, Congress included some provi-
sions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 20 4 with respect to single stock
futures and financial holding companies which left conflict resolution
to the Federal Reserve Board. 20 5
For many years, the financial regulatory agencies, including the
SEC, have been more concerned about the promotion of trading effi-
202 The theory of agency capture emerged during the period from 1967 to 1983
questioning prevailing perceptions of administrative agencies as instruments for pro-
moting the public interest. The agency became viewed as a vulnerable governmental
institution more concerned with expanding its budget than serving the public. Ad-
ministrative agencies were regarded as subject to interest group capture. Therefore,
rigid control is needed in order to fight the distortions of the administrative process.
One way to do so is to make agency work more open. For an analysis of the develop-
ment of agency capture theory, see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theoiy and the Courts:
1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997); see also supra note 174.
203 PETER H. HUANG, REGULATING IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE AND ANXIETY IN SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, (Inst. for Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 03-34, 2003).
204 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at scattered sections of 12
and 15 U.S.C.).
205 KENNETH R. BENSON ET AL., FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION: GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, LAW AND EXPLANATION 3 (1999);Jonathan R. Macey, The
Business of Banking Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 710 (2000).
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ciencies and giving financial institutions, especially banks, the ability
to lay off risk in the markets than they have been about preventing
securities speculation. Even after the warnings sounded by the 1987
stock market crash and the LTCM debacle, regulators focused on en-
couraging risk management by financial institutions and markets
rather than worrying about leverage and market manipulation.
Whether such a focus is wise is an important public policy question
which does not seem to have been much debated.
CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that an important cause of the 1990s stock
market bubble was speculative trading by institutional investors. Fur-
ther, the regulation of the investment practices of such investors is
conducted by a plethora of federal and state regulators, is uncoordi-
nated and is generally lax to nonexistent. While federal government
control of institutional investor decisionmaking would be unfortu-
nate, better federal articulation and regulation of a prudent investor
standard for pension fund assets, including assets in defined contribu-
tion plans, would be worthy of consideration, particularly in view of
ERISA's preemption of state law fiduciary standards.
Although the SEC and Federal Reserve Board were aware of the
irrational exuberance of the stock market in the late 1990s and they
had some regulatory tools for pricking the bubble, they did not make
use of any such tools to control securities credit or leverage in the
markets or to dampen speculative trading. If the SEC had decided to
do so, the agency probably would have been frustrated by opposition
from the Federal Reserve Board, the CFTC and, finally, Congress. 20 6
After the stock market crashed, Congress and financial regulators
blamed public companies and their managers and directors for the
bubble. Sarbanes-Oxley was addressed almost entirely to questionable
financial reporting by public companies and their officers and direc-
tors, and failures by their gatekeepers to prevent such misreporting.
Prosecutions by federal and state law enforcement officials satisfied
the public's need for scapegoats. Few, if any, of these actions fingered
the role of institutional investors in the stock market debacle. More
recently, the SEC (and the New York Attorney General) have focused
on questionable trading practices by mutual funds and hedge funds,
but the focus of these actions has not been the prevention of specula-
206 Congressional oversight of financial regulators is dysfunctional, corrupted by
campaign contributions and competition between congressional committees for over-
sight responsibility with regard to the numerous agencies regulating the capital mar-
kets and financial institutions.
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tive stock market run ups. Further, the SEC and others have focused
on the role of securities analysts in underwritings, but not on whether
or how customary underwriting practices could be reformed.
In the absence of a new crisis involving derivatives, excessive lev-
erage in the market or manipulative activities by institutional inves-
tors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial
regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investor behav-
ior. This is unfortunate, since institutions control and invest the re-
tirement savings of most investors in the public securities markets.
950 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:3
